We uncover privacy vulnerabilities in the ICAO 9303 standard implemented by ePassports worldwide. These vulnerabilities, confirmed by ICAO, enable an ePassport holder who recently passed through a checkpoint to be reidentified without openning their ePassport. This paper explains how bisimilarity was used to discover these vulnerabilities. In order to tackle such bisimilarity problems, we develop here a chain of methods for the applied π-calculus including a symbolic under approximation of bisimilarity, called open bisimilarity, and a modal logic, called classical FM, for describing and certifying attacks. Evidence is provided to argue for a new scheme for specifying such unlinkability problems that more accurately reflects the capabilities of an attacker.
Introduction
Most of us have the option to pass through automatic passport clearance at an airport. Some of us also have electronic national cards that may be used for government services. All of these machine readable documents employ a protocol to authenticate with a reader, establishing that you really hold a valid machine readable document. In order for ePassports and readers to be read internationally, your passport is likely to implement a standardised protocol for machine readable travel documents, defined by the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) -the UN agency responsible for international aviation standards.
Considerable work has been put into ensuring ePassports satisfy security properties, preventing your ePassport from being read by an unauthorised 3 rd -party in the vicinity. However, even if such security properties are satisfied, there may still be ways of exploiting a protocol to mount more subtle attacks on your privacy. Notably, a requirement of ePassports, is that an unauthorised 3 rdparty should not be able to use an ePassport to track the document holder. This privacy property is called unlinkability, and is an official requirement of the ICAO 9303 standard for machine readable travel documents [MRT15] .
It has been debated over the past decade whether or not the ICAO 9303 standard satisfies unlinkability. Vulnerabilities have been discovered by exploiting implementation specific features, such as the different error messages in the French ePassport, or the differences in response time of the ePassports of different nationalities [CS10, ABH + 16]. For example, an error message in the French ePassport indicates whether a message authentication code (MAC) test passed, despite authentication failing; hence if a message with the same MAC key is replayed from a previous session with the same ePassport, then we can detect whether or not the same ePassport is present in the current session. Notice this requires no access to the personal data stored inside the ePassport. Now put implementation-specific side channels aside and consider whether unlinkability holds at the level of the specification of the Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol, as defined in the ICAO 9303 standard. A claim was reported in CSF'10 [ACRR10] that unlinkability does hold for ePassports that conservatively implement the BAC protocol. In particular, the claim concerns implementations where the same plaintext message should be provided for all types of error, as is the case for the UK ePassport for example. That claim was backed up by a formal model of a property that should hold if unlinkability of BAC holds, which is expressed as a bisimilarity problem in the applied π-calculus [ABF17] . The problem is that this original claim, was discovered to be false, as reported in ESORICS'19 [FHMS19] . This indicates a failure of the ICAO 9303 BAC protocol to meet its own requirements.
However, this is not the end of the story behind this privacy vulnerability, which has several twists. A twist is that the original claim which we discovered to be flawed was based on a proof in ProVerif, that went through due to a bug, now resolved in Proverif. When the bug was corrected the old proof didn't go through, but no proof or counter-example was reported until ESORICS'19 [FHMS19] . This indicates the need to improve methods and tools for supporting bisimilarity checking in the applied π-calculus, so that false privacy claims about widely deployed protocols do not go undetected for a decade.
There are further twists in this story. In the effort to improve tools and methods for resolving such unlinkability problems, several alternative specifications modelling the unlinkability of BAC have been proposed over the years. Some such models can be used to prove that there is no attack [HBD19] , first communicated in S&P'16 [HBD16] . The key difference between the original CSF'10 model, for which we discovered an attack in ESORICS'19, and the S&P'16 model, where they prove there is no attack, is the use of trace equivalence rather than bisimilarity in the latter. This is interesting, since there are few, if any, protocols and properties where the use of bisimilarity rather than trace equivalence is essential for discovering vulnerabilities, at least on a widely-deployed protocol. Furthermore, it provokes the question of which equivalence provides the appropriate attacker model: are vulnerabilities discovered using bisimilarity, but undetectable using trace equivalence exploitable; and, if so, are they perhaps less dangerous in some sense than attacks which can be described as a trace?
For the BAC protocol we have answered the question of exploitability in the positive. Using a modified reader and ePassport we have demonstrated how the distinguishing game exposed by the failure of bisimilarity can be exploited to reidentify an ePassport. That particular implementation of the vulnerability discovered using bisimilarity (there are infinitely many mutations of this attack) was reported through a responsible disclosure process to ICAO in June 2019.
ICAO issued a public response made available via numerous press reports [Del19, Lab19a, Lab19b] . In their response, ICAO make the following statement.
It's also important to consider here that the described issue, which could be exploited for example at border controls or at other inspection system areas, would only allow adversaries to be able to know that somebody recently passed through a passport check-and even without opening their ePassport. The personal data stored in the contactless chip, however, would not be disclosed. Understandably, ICAO aim to contain this issue, and we have no interest in creating a scandal, only in ensuring the appropriate agencies receive accurate information. However, please note that the above statement confirms that ICAO agree the vulnerability is real and would, we quote again for emphasis, "allow adversaries to be able to know that somebody recently passed through a passport check-and even without opening their ePassport." This exactly matches our own claims about the capabilities offered to an attacker exploiting the vulnerability discovered. The word "recent" in the above context, means that someone can only be tracked for as long as the attacker can keep open a session with the passport reader they have recently passed through; which, in practice, can only be a short period of time. This contrasts to more serious implementation specific vulnerabilities, which can be exploited to track the ePassport holder indefinitely. Being able to reidentify someone within a time-limited period is nonetheless a violation of unlinkability.
It is also important that we clarify the following public response from ICAO, also, understandably, aiming to contain any fall out from a vulnerability affecting citizens using their ePassport standard world-wide.
ICAO and experts have thoroughly reviewed this research and their initial analysis is that it is not linked to Doc 9303 specifications in their current version. This is especially the case given that the newest Doc 9303 specifications incorporate the PACE protocol, which is considered a more secure alternative to the BAC protocol. What the above means is that the vulnerability reported at ESORICS'19 was for the BAC protocol. The BAC protocol is the authentication mechanism used to ensure the ePassport and reader are really talking to each other before exchanging any personal data stored on the ePassport. It has been used since the first generation of ePassports, issued since 2004, and, at the time of writing, is still supported by ePassports. BAC has known security limitations, for example the keys are generated using information such as the passport number and expiry dates, which have low entropy [BFK09] . Thus there are attacks that can enable a user to compromise the secrecy of the personal data on an ePassport protected by BAC. For this reason, ICAO have developed the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol, addressing such vulnerabilities that can lead to data breaches. Note a data breach would also immediately compromise unlinkability, since the attacker would have direct access to the identity of the ePassport holder.
Thus, PACE is an improvement over BAC from the perspective of secrecy; however, secrecy and privacy are not the same thing. Indeed, we report here that, PACE is also vulnerable to attacks on unlinkability by adopting a similar strategy to the attacks on BAC reported in ESORICS'19. As with BAC, we can formally account for this vulnerability by showing that PACE does not satisfy unlinkability, formalised in terms of bisimilarity. Note that ePassports implementing BAC or PACE are now issued by over 150 countries 1 , hence the impact for society of this vulnerability is global.
This paper is an extended version of a paper presented at ESORICS'19. In the conference version of this paper, we explained the privacy vulnerability discovered in the BAC protocol and explained how the attack can be implemented in a real world setting. This paper complements the conference version by focusing on our methodology for analysing such unlinkability problems rather than the implementation concerns. We explain the formal methods we developed and employed to quickly discover attacks on the unlinkability of BAC, and also PACE. To approach the bisimilarity problem behind unlinkability, we employ a game between a prover aiming to show unlinkability holds and a disprover aiming to show there is an attack on unlinkability. The prover uses symbolic techniques to try to construct a bisimulation for an under-approximation of bisimilarity (open bisimilarity); while the disprover aims to verify whether any attacks discovered are genuine distinguishing strategies invalidating the bisimilarity problem or whether they are spurious counterexamples due to the fact that symbolic methods are incomplete. If a spurious counter-example is discovered, then the reason why it is spurious is used to refine and resume the search for a bisimulation. If this game terminates, we should have constructed either a bisimulation (thereby proving the unlinkability property) or a modal logic formula explaining a distinguishing strategy (thereby discovering an attack on unlinkability). Another notable feature or the method in this work is that we show that unlinkability problems, which are traditionally expressed as a weak bisimilarity problem, can be reduced to a strong bisimilarity problem, thereby ensuring the transition system is image finite, considerably simplifying the problem. This is, in itself, a contribution of this work, since strong bisimilarity had not previously been defined for the applied π-calculus, nor has its characteristic modal logic previously been defined, for which we provide soundness and completeness results.
How to read this paper. The focus of this paper is on analysing unlinkability properties of ePassport protocols. During the course of our discussion on unlinkability, we introduce various methods which play a role in our formal analysis. In order to follow these methods some knowledge of the π-calculus and bisimilarity is a prerequisite. It is not necessary to have knowledge of the applied π-calculus, since we introduce a state-of-the-art presentation of the semantics of the applied π-calculus facilitating the translation of recent advances in the theory of the π-calculus to the setting of the applied π-calculus. We move quickly through such definitions, in order to get the point concerning how the methods are used to discover attacks on unlinkability.
In Sections 2 and 3, we explain our methodology and how it can be used to efficiently analyse problems such as the unlinkability of ePassport protocols, thereby providing evidence necessary to prove that we have closed the question of whether the original formulation of the unlinkability of ePassport protocol BAC is violated. Section 4, reflects on established notions of unlinkability, thereby making a case for instead employing a new notion of unlinkability which makes the realistic assumption that an attacker can distinguish between communications originating from different ePassport sessions. Section 5, demonstrates that there is a similar attack on the unlinkability of the latest ePassport protocol PACE. The attack on PACE is confirmed using our methodology. We conclude in Sections 6 and 7, by acknowledging the wider discussion on ePassport privacy and unlinkability to which this paper contributes.
Reducing strong unlinkability to a strong bisimilarity problem
The ICAO 9303 standard recommends two authentication protocols for ePassports. The Basic Access Control protocol (BAC) was the authentication protocol originally proposed. The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol (PACE) was added in the 7 th edition of the standard released in 2015.
In this section, here we briefly explain the BAC protocol and show how it can be modelled as processes in the applied π-calculus. We capture a version of the BAC protocol implemented in UK ePassports, as defined in CSF'10 [ACRR10]; although this version of the BAC protocol captures the way countries should implement the BAC protocol hence the analysis is not limited UK ePassports. We focus on the methodology used to discover unlinkability attacks on the BAC protocol. An analysis of the PACE protocol appears later in Sec. 5.
2.1. The BAC protocol. The BAC protocol is sketched informally in Fig. 1 . Dashed lines ( ) indicate a message transmitted via an OCR session that reads the personal page of an ePassport. The data read in the initial OCR session is used to calculate the symmetric keys ke and km used respectively for encryption and as the seed of message authentication codes (MACs). Importantly, these key are the same for every session involving the same ePassport. Solid lines are wireless communications between a chip embedded in the ePassport and radio frequency reader.
The reader first sends a constant message get challenge requesting a challenge -a nonce nt sent by the ePassport -which is used during the mutual authentication of the ePassport and reader. The reader shows it has the keys by responding to the challenge with a message including nonce nt encrypted and authenticated using the keys, thereby authenticating the reader from the perspective of the ePassport. In that message, the reader sends its own challenge nr, which the ePassport must respond to. The ePassport responds to the reader with a message involving nonce nr and nt. encrypted and authenticated using the keys, thereby authenticating the ePassport to the reader. Notice only the ePassport that shared keys ke and km and sent challenge nt can respond in this way, assuming the keys are never exchange with a malicious 3 rd -party.
We can be precise about the functional properties that BAC achieves. Firstly, BAC achieves an authentication property called (injective) agreement [Low97] . Secondly, BAC establishes shared secrets kr and kt which are used to generate a symmetric key for transmitting personal data. These properties are easily checked using automated tools such as Scyther [Cre08] .
The ICAO 9303 standard specifies that an "operating system dependent error" [MRT15] should be sent when authentication fails. Such a failure occurs when the ePassport receives an authentication request from the reader, and either the message authentication code (MAC) is wrong, or a nonce in the message does not match the challenge nt previously sent by the ePassport.
2.2. BAC in the applied π-calculus. We employ the applied π-calculus to model the operational behaviour of participants in the protocol and how they are combined to form a system. The syntax of processes is presented in Fig. 2 , along with a message theory featuring pairs and symmetric encryption (encryption using a shared secret key). The message theory also features a MAC function -a cryptographic hash function with no equations.
For readability, we employ the abbreviation let x = M in P P M / x in the following specifications of an ePassport (MRTD) and ePassport reader (Reader). System νc k .(!Reader | !νke.νkm.!MRTD)
In the system above, the private channel c k is used to initiate a session between an ePassport and Reader. Notice that the keys ke and km serve as the identity of each ePassport, since they are fixed for an ePassport when it is manufactured. Thus the innermost replication in !νke.νkm.!MRTD models that the same ePassport may be used across multiple sessions, while the outermost replication indicates that there are many different ePassports, each employing distinct keys.
2.3. Strong unlinkability and bisimilarity. We formulate strong unlinkability as an equivalence problem by setting out to show that System, as defined above, is equivalent to an idealised specification of the system that trivially satisfies unlinkability. The idealised specification models a more restricted variant of the system where each ePassport is used only once -as if once an ePassport is read it is destroyed and a new ePassport is issued for any future sessions. We employ the following process to model the specification.
Spec νc k .(!Reader | !νke.νkm.MRTD) Notice the only difference between System and Spec is the absence of replication after the generation of the key. Thus, in Spec, each new session is with a new ePassport with a freshly generated key. Trivially, there is no way to link two sessions with the same ePassport in the above specification.
We specify unlinkability by stating that it holds whenever System and Spec are equivalent from the perspective of an attacker. In principle, the idea is that if an attacker cannot tell the difference between a scenario where the same tag is allowed to be used in multiple sessions and the scenario where each tag is really used once, then you cannot link two uses of the same tag.
In this work, when we say equivalent we mean bisimilar, or observationally equivalent. We briefly present a formulation of (early) bisimilarity for the applied π-calculus. Our presentation makes use of extended processes (in normal form), and a pure labelled transition system which simplifies the analysis of bisimilarity.
Extended processes ν x.(σ | P) consist of a set of restricted names x, a substitution σ mapping variables to messages, and an applied π-calculus process P, where we write νx 1 .νx 2 . . . . νx n .P as νx 1 , x 2 , . . . x n .P. In this work we always assume extended processes are in normal form meaning they are subject to the restriction that the variables dom(σ) (i.e., those variables z such that z zσ) are fresh for x, fv(P) and fv(yσ), for all variables y (i.e., σ is idempotent, and substitution σ has already been applied to P). The substitution in an extended process is referred to as an active substitution. We follow the convention that operational rules are defined directly on extended processes in normal form. Note adopting normal forms removes the need for several additional conditions that must be imposed in other formulations of bisimilarity for the applied π-calculus [ABF17] .
We require a standard notion of static equivalence, which checks two processes are indistinguishable in terms of the messages output so far. We require the following definitions for composing extended processes in parallel and with substitutions, defined whenever z fv(B) ∪ fv(ρ) and dom(σ) ∩ dom(θ) = ∅.
The above definitions are employed in our definition of (early) labelled transitions ( Fig. 3) , which are defined directly on extended processes in normal form. Labels on transitions are either: τ -an internal communication; M(z) -an output on channel M binding the output message to variable z; or M N -an input on channel M receiving message N. (Notice if-then-else processes makes no additional τ-transitions in this presentation, in contrast to established reduction semantics [ABF17] .)
The early labelled transition system and static equivalence together can be used to define early bisimilarity. Initially, we employ a weak formulation of early bisimilarity, making use of weak transitions A π B which allow zero or more τ transitions to occur before and after the transition π or zero transitions if π = τ. Definition 2.2 (early bisimilarity). A symmetric relation between extended processes R is an early bisimulation only if, whenever A R B the following hold:
• A and B are statically equivalent.
• If A π A there exists B such that B π B and A R B . Processes P and Q are early bisimilar, written P ≈ Q, whenever there exists an early bisimulation R such that P R Q. Now we have the formal tools to express the theorem that confirms that strong unlinkability does not hold for the BAC protocol. The above is the theorem that contradicts the claim reported in CSF'10 [ACRR10] that unlinkability holds for this formulation of the BAC protocol. Much of the rest of the paper is dedicated to explaining the methodology we used to prove the above result, by constructing an attack strategy invalidating the claim in Sec. 3. Later in Sec. 4 we will also make a case for adjusting the model and in Sec. 5 we will show how the analysis can be repeated for PACE.
2.4.
Reducing weak to strong bisimilarity. A challenge with the CSF'10 specification of unlinkability is that it is formulated using weak bisimilarity, and the weak transitions system generated by System and Spec is not image finite.
Definition 2.4. A labelled transition system and set of process P is image finite, whenever for any process A ∈ P, and label π, there are finitely many B such that A π B, up to α-conversion.
When we do not have image finiteness we need to find a finite representation of infinitely many processes reachable by a transition. Such a representation must be identified at every step when constructing a bisimulation, which can make verification challenging. To see this challenge, observe there are infinitely many states reachable by τ-transitions from Spec of the following form.
To simplify verification, we show that the problem of analysing the unlinkability of BAC can be transformed into an equivalent problem where image finiteness does hold, thereby avoiding the need to explicitly deal with reasoning about transitions such as the above. The procedure we employ involves removing the τ-transition from the model, effectively reducing the unlinkability problem to a strong bisimilarity problem.
We define an alternative system System and specification Spec, as follows.
Spec !νke.νkm.(V(ke, km) | P(ke, km)) In the above processes, the keys ke and km have been distributed in advance to the relevant parties; hence a τ transition is not required to initiate a reader and ePassport with the same keys. We then show that each process above is bisimilar to the original system and specification respectively. It is easier to establish a more general result, stated in the lemma below, which can be used to transform the unlinkability problem for related protocols into a form where we have image finiteness.
Lemma 2.5. For any P and Q such that c k is fresh for P and Q, we have
Proof. In the proof of the above lemma we employ equivariance, which simply allows names to be swapped. Working up to equivariance has been shown to significantly reduce the search space when constructing a bisimulation [TNH16] .
Definition 2.6. Equivariance is the least congruence such that νx.νy.P ≡ νy.νx.P and extending αconversion, thereby allowing the order of name binders to be ignored. Term a(x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n ).P is an abbreviation for a(x).P proj 1 (x),proj 2 (x),...proj n (x) / x 1 ,x 2 ,...x n , where proj i is the obvious generalisation of fst() and snd() to tuples.
Define R to be the least symmetric relation, upto equivariance, such that for any R i and S i such that c k is fresh for R i and S i and r is fresh for P and Q, we have that the following extended process
is related by R to the following extended process
There are two cases to pay attention to concerning extra τ transitions in B. Firstly, consider
This can be matched by B by performing zero transitions, whilst staying in the relation R.
The second important case to consider is when for some j ∈ {1..n} \ f ({1..m}) we have P k j / k or Q k j / k acts (or indeed they interact), possibly extruding some active substitution σ and fresh names s, as follows.
In this case, B stays within relation R by using transition
Note we should also consider when two distinct j, j ∈ {1..n} \ f ({1..m}) interact in A, which has a similar pattern, except we require pairs of processes to be added to B using the rule Rep-close.
Notice the above proof is just a sketch. To go through all details would be cumbersome, indicating the amount of work that is saved when applying the above lemma to reduce the complexity of the unlinkability problem we aim to solve. By a similar argument we can also establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7. For any P and Q such that c k is fresh for P and Q, we have
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.5 and Lemma 2.7 we obtain. Since, in this model of the BAC protocol, all communications on public channels use channel c for outputs and d for inputs, there are no τ transitions in System or Spec. Thereby we have reduced the problem to a form where we can apply the strong variant of early bisimilarity, defined as follows.
Definition 2.9 (strong bisimilarity). A symmetric relation between extended processes R is a strong bisimulation only if, whenever A R B the following hold:
• If A π A there exists B such that B π B and A R B . Processes P and Q are strong bisimilar, written P ∼ Q, whenever there exists a strong bisimulation R such that P R Q.
Notice the only difference compared to Def. 2.2 is that, in clause two, every transition is matched by exactly one transition. The following theorem summarises the correctness of the transformation of the unlinkability problem applied in this section, where the proof is immediate from Corollary 2.8 and the absence of τ-transitions in System and Spec. 
Searching for a bisimulation symbolically
Having reduced unlinkability to a strong bisimilarity problem, we now aim to prove or disprove System ∼ Spec. To do so, we attempt to construct a strong bisimulation R such that System R Spec. However, naïvely searching for a bisimulation using the early labelled transition system in Fig. 3 is challenging, since we must consider an infinite number of messages which can be received for every input. And, although it has been shown that checking a bounded number of such messages suffices for message theories such as the one we employ, the bound on the number of messages to check is hyper-exponential [Hüt03] .
For this reason, it makes sense to approach the problem using symbolic methods, for which we apply open bisimulation which is an under-approximation of early bisimilarity. Care must be taken, since open bisimilarity however may discover false attacks for the BAC unlinkability problem. Hence the use of open bisimilarity must be complemented by a methodology for verifying whether an attack discovered using symbolic methods is a real attack or not.
3.1. Open bisimilarity as a symbolic under-approximation. Open bisimilarity is suited to symbolic analysis of protocols, since it permits inputs to be lazily instantiated. Previously, open bisimilarity has been defined for a slightly less abstract and general cryptographic calculus, called the spi-calculus [BN07, Tiu07, AG99]. For analysing the unlinkability of ePassports we require the additional power of the applied π-calculus, hence introduce a notion of open bisimilarity for the applied π-calculus. This definition of open bisimilarity is a contribution of this paper.
Open bisimilarity is defined in terms of a late labelled transition system, differing from the early labelled transition system in the rules presented in Fig. 4 . Instead of sets of private names, we employ histories defined by grammar h | h · x o | h · M i , representing the order in which messages are sent and received, and a set of inequalities D = {M 1 N 1 , M 2 N 2 , . . .}, called a distinction. Notice each rule carries a history and distinction that may be used to resolve the oElse rule, by providing sufficient evidence that two messages are not equal (i.e., negation is treated constructively). Other key differences compared to Fig. 3 are the updating of the history in rule oRes, and the use of bounded inputs in the rules oInp, oClose-l, oRep-close.
Substitutions respecting histories, are key to the lazy approach of open bisimilarity. 
Open bisimilarity can now be defined as follows. 3.2.1. Initiate two readers with the same passport. Our system, System, makes the first moves by starting two reader sessions, both of which are loaded with the key information of the same ePassport. This can be achieved by triggering two outputs, which must be get challenge messages from readers and then sending one input to an ePassport, as in the following three transitions.
where System I is defined as follows (employing abbreviations in Fig. 5 ):
Spec can only follow these actions, by starting two reader sessions with different ePassports.
where Spec I :
Note, since bisimilarity is preserved by associativity and commutativity of parallel composition and equivariance, this also covers the case where, in the specification, the input is received by the ePassport with keys ke 2 and km 2 . Note there is a third possible response by the specification, where a third session with yet another set of keys is started, but the distinguishing strategy in that branch is subsumed by the distinguishing strategy in the cases we explain. A history tracks constraints on variables:
3.2.2. Applying respectful substitutions. Since we are reasoning symbolically, the input is initially a variable x. When unfolding the rules of the labelled transition in Fig. 4 we find that the following transition is enabled for substitutions σ such that there exists θ such that get challenge / x · θ = σ, i.e., get challenge / x is a most general unifier for the guard x = get challenge.
x get challenge / x = get challenge νnt.c nt .P2(ke, km, nt) c( ) νnt 1 . nt 1 / | P2(ke, km, nt 1 )
The above transition is valid as long as the unifier get challenge / x respects history error i ·get challenge i · c i · d i · u 1 o · u 2 o · x i , which is trivially the case, since no fresh names are involved. Using this transition we induce the following transitions for the system and specification.
where System II is defined as follows (employing abbreviations in Fig. 5 ):
and Spec II is defined as follows
Note the substitution is also applied to the history error i ·get challenge i ·c i ·d i ·u o 1 ·u o 2 ·get challenge i · o . This updated history indicates the most recent input was a get challenge message.
3.2.3.
Alternating play in the distinguishing game. We now appeal to the symmetry of bisimilarity, allowing the specification System II to lead with one input. That strategy allows us to trigger the reader which does not have the same keys as the ePassport that outputs a nonce in the previous step. That approach leads to a distinguishing game that quite accurately describes a practical strategy (which we have demonstrated can be implemented), where the attacker deliberately selects the reader that should fail to authenticate an ePassport if unlinkability really holds.
The flow is as follows, where annotation ( †) indicates the player (the system or specification) that leads at each point in the game. Note the system has always been leading up to now, in order to trigger the scenario where two sessions with the same ePassport really started.
where System IV is defined as follows (employing abbreviations in Fig. 5 ):
νke 1 , km 1 , nt 1 , nr 2 , kr 2 . get challenge, get challenge / u 1 , u 2 | nt 1 / | { nr 2 , nt, kr 2 } ke 1 , mac { nr 2 , nt, kr 2 } ke 1 ,km 1 / | V1(ke 1 , km 1 ) | P3(ke 1 , km 1 , nt, ) | 0 | P(ke 1 , km 1 ) | !(V(ke 1 , km 1 ) | P(ke 1 , km 1 )) | !νke.νkm.!(V(ke, km) | P(ke, km)) and Spec IV is defined as follows νke 1 , km 1 , ke 2 , km 2 , nt 1 , nr 2 , kr 2 .
Observe that all the above transitions proceed lazily without instantiating the input variable nt. In the specification, the reader with keys ke 2 , km 2 is used up entirely, without determining yet what challenge was received. Observe also, that the System II has only one option, up to structural rules such as commutativity of parallel composition, for following the specification (without being immediately distinguishable), which is to continue a session with keys ke 1 , km 1 .
Remark 3.3 (playing this strategy). A question arising at this point is whether the change of player at this point is meaningful in terms of attacker models. This perhaps requires domain specific knowledge. Observe that the input action where the specification leads selects a specific reader, which should ideally behave as if it has different keys from the ePassport issuing the challenge nonce. In reality, the attacker does indeed have the power to chose which reader to send an input to and so can indeed choose the reader that, according to the specification of unlinkability, not successfully authenticates with the ePassport, i.e., the reader that is not located next to an ePassport that has just engaged in an OCR session with it. Thus the need for a game at this point is due to underspecification in the model where there are insufficient observables to determine that the reader is not in proximity to the ePassport issuing a challenge. Note this is far from being the only distinguishing strategy; other distinguishing strategies may require a different domain-specific explanation.
3.2.4. Calculating inputs using the sequent calculus. Now consider whether P3(ke 1 , km 1 , nt, ), expanded below, can make progress.
if snd(y) = mac(fst(y) , km 1 ) then if nt = fst(snd(dec(fst(y) , ke 1 ))) then νkt.let m = { nt, fst(dec(fst(y) , ke 1 )), kt } ke 1 in c m, mac(m, km 1 ) else c error By the rules in Fig. 4 , the two positive branches resulting in a non-error output, can only be triggered for respectful substitutions σ such that.
snd( ) σ = E mac(fst( ) , km 1 ) σ and nt 1 σ = E fst(snd(dec(fst( ) , ke 1 ))) σ
We show how to calculate the most general unifier for the above equations. Firstly, we remove destructors fst(·), snd(·) and dec(·, ·) by instantiating variables to which they are applied with the most general form of the constructor to which the destructor is applied. This yields the following substitution, where y 1 and y 2 are fresh variables.
The problem now is to calculate the most general form of y 1 and y 2 refining the above substitution such that it respects current history error i · get challenge i · c i · d i · u o 1 · u o 2 · get challenge i · o · nt i · o · i , appended with nt o 1 · ke o 1 · km o 1 · nr o 2 · kr o 2 , due to the oRes rule. This question can be formulated as the problem of determining whether a system of deduction problems generated from the above history have a solution, while taking into account the above substitution for y and the active substitution of The first step in this calculation is to generate a constraint system to solve. The following is an alternative representation of a history, where the names to the left of each turnstile represent the knowledge of the attacker before each input to the right of that turnstile is performed.
In this case it is sufficient to consider the final two deduction problems. Also, u 1 and u 2 provide no new information so can be safely removed. From constraints nt and , y, annotated with the active substitution of System IV and the substitution for y above, we construct the deducibility constraint : nt 1 nt : nt , where nt is a fresh variable, and also the following deducibility constraint.
:
In the above, variables u 1 and u 2 are annotated with their respective messages from the active substitution in System IV . Also, notice that nt is replaced by nt in the above, where nt represents nt but allowing any occurrences of and to be instantiated with their respective messages. We solve the above deduction problem by calculating a substitution such that there is a proof tree using the sequent calculus rules in Fig. 6 , where the leaves of each proof are in solved form. A solved form is a deducibility constraint of the form Γ x : x , where x, x are variables, meaning that x, x can be anything produced using information in Γ. Note Fig. 6 extends an existing sequent calculus presentation of deducibility constraints [TGD10] with annotations to the left of a colon representing how a message is deduced. Furthermore, we assume that the names representing outputs ( and ) are atomic names, while y, nt, y 1 , y 2 , nt are open variables.
For this system of constraints, the only possibility, is to apply the axiom in Fig. 6 . This is achieved by unifying the following messages (recall nt 1 , ke 1 , km 1 , nr 2 , kr 2 are atomic names):
We now use the most general unifier for the above problem, nt 1 , nr 2 , kr 2 / nt , y 1 , y 2 thereby allowing axioms in Fig. 6 to be applied as long we apply also the substitution , / nt, . Thereby we obtain the following two proofs consisting of a single axiom each, where a proof is a proof tree where all leaves are axioms (hence the set of premises are empty and hence vacuously in solved form).
: nt 1 : nt 1 : nt 1 , : { nr 2 , nt 1 , kr 2 } ke 1 , mac { nr 2 , nt 1 , kr 2 } ke 1 , km 1 v : { nr 2 , nt 1 , kr 2 } ke 1 , mac { nr 2 , nt 1 , kr 2 } ke 1 , km 1 Thereby we have calculated the most general respectful substitution , / nt, , enabling the following transition.
where the frame of System V (ignoring the process) is as follows.
νke 1 , km 1 , nt 1 , nr 2 , kr 2 , kt 1 . get challenge, get challenge / u 1 ,
Observe that the specification, Spec IV , / nt, can also perform an output, either starting a new session, or triggering an error message. In either case, we reach a state that is distinguishable by static equivalence witnessed by the test z = error or z = get challenge respectively.
Notice that in the specification, the else branch in which an error message is output is enabled by the oElse rule in Fig. 4 . That rule is enabled only when the following inequality holds.
where h is the current history extended with the private names by using the oRes rule as follows.
The above inequality is satisfied, since there is no substitution respecting the above history equating the two terms in the inequality. To see why, observe that any unifier for the above message equates km 1 and km 2 , which must be kept distinct by any substitution respecting the above history, since both km o 1 and km o 2 appear in the history.
3.3. Constructing a distinguishing formula from the distinguishing strategy. Firstly, we briefly summarise the distinguishing strategy calculated in the previous sections.
(1) System leads with transitions labelled c(u 1 ) then c(u 2 ) and then d(x) (thereby reaching System I in which sessions have started with two readers and an ePassport, all using the same keys). (2) System I get challenge / x leads with transition labelled c( ). If Spec I get challenge / x follows with = get challenge, we are done otherwise continue. (3) Spec II leads with transition labelled d(nt) starting up the wrong reader. If System II follows by inputting the wrong message into a new ePassport session we can distinguish with one more action, otherwise continue. (4) System III leads with transitions labelled c( ) and then d(y). If Spec III follows with = get challenge we are done, otherwise continue. (5) System IV , / nt, leads with transitions c(z). This can only be followed by transition from Spec IV , / nt, where z = error or z = get challenge. The problem now is that open bisimilarity (Def. 3.2) does not satisfy any notion of completeness, hence a distinguishing strategy may be a spurious counterexample. Spurious counterexamples, cannot be transformed into counterexamples for strong early bisimilarity (Def. 2.9) and are less likely to indicate the presence of an attack.
The above strategy does not describe a spurious counterexample; and furthermore it can be turned into a real attack. In order to show that it is not a spurious counterexample, our methodology is to construct a modal logic formula from the distinguishing strategy. Instead of using a modal logic characterising open bisimilarity (which would be a generalisation of intuitionistic OM [AHT17] to the applied π-calculus) we employ a modal logic characterising strong early bisimilarity called classical F M.
3.3.1. Introducing classical FM. The syntax of modal logic classical FM (F is for free inputs, M is for match [MPW93] 
The semantics of classical FM is given by the least relation A | = φ between extended processes A and formulae φ satisfying the conditions in Fig. 7 . The proof is provided in the appendix. From the contrapositive of the above theorem, whenever P Q, there exists a formula φ such that P | = φ holds, but Q | = φ. Such a formula is called a distinguishing formula.
3.3.2. The attack as a formula. In the case of the failure of strong unlinkability of the UK BAC protocol, we have the following classical FM formula, say ψ.
For this formula we can verify System | = ψ holds; while Spec | = ψ. Hence, by Theorem 3.4, System Spec; thereby by Theorem 2.10, the unlinkability of BAC does not hold, as stated in Theorem 2.3.
This closes the initial question of whether or not the unlinkability of BAC holds; the answer is that BAC does not satisfy unlinkability, as least as specified originally in CSF'10 [ACRR10]. This leads to several immediate questions. Firstly, how do we construct the above formula from the distinguishing strategy given by open bisimilarity? Secondly, can we explain why the formula is distinguishing, and from that explanation describe a practical attack? Thirdly, how do we approach this problem in general, e.g., when a spurious counterexample is discovered?
We emphasise at this point that there are infinitely many alternative distinguishing formulae for this problem, not only ψ. Some such distinguishing formulae use no box modality and instead employs conjunction, where conjunction also appeals to the branching time nature of bisimilarity.
We postpone discussing alternatives until Sec. 4, where we propose an alternative model of unlinkability, where the meaning of distinguishing strategies is clearer. a stronger attacker model, and also, being a congruence, facilitates compositional reasoning. The only reason we use early bisimilarity in this paper is in order to prove that the attack discovered closes the original problem. In short, we advocate quasi-open bisimilarity for checking privacy properties; but acknowledge the community must first be convinced that the methodology proposed solves established problems.
3.3.3.
Constructing the formula. We construct a formula by induction on the depth of the distinguishing strategy. To do so, we work backwards through the distinguishing strategy summarised at the top of Sec. 3.3. Firstly, observe that when the system is in state System V the specification must be in a state where either error = z, get challenge = z or get challenge = , where each pair of messages shows static equivalence is violated. Since for System V both and z cannot be unified with get challenge or error with respect to the history at that point, the intuitionistic negation and classical negation coincide for these equalities, leading to the following formula distinguishing System V from any state the specification can reach at that point.
Since the system led to reach this state with transition System IV , / nt,
System V , we add a diamond modality to the formula, as follows.
The above step is standard for constructing modal logic formulae for distinguishing strategies; however the next step requires care. Firstly, note that the substitution , / nt, concerns input variables. Thus we push these substitutions back through the distinguishing strategy until the relevant input is instantiated. In this case, since the action in the distinguishing strategy reaching System IV , / nt, input , that variable is instantiated immediately, and nt is pushed back through the strategy, refining the distinguishing strategy to obtain the following transitions using the rules of Fig. 3 . Since the system was leading System III { / nt } it can be distinguished from Spec III { / nt } by the following formula.
The next step in the distinguishing strategy involves a change of leading player in the distinguishing strategy, where the specification leads with an action. By pushing back the substitution through the strategy, instantiating the input variable on the label, we have the following transition led by the specification: Spec II d Spec III { / nt }. Since the specification leads at this point and the system follows in any way it can, we write the box modality in the distinguishing formula for the system followed by a disjunction of formulae, where each formula distinguishes Spec III { / nt } from any state reachable from System II by an input transition labelled with d . Observe that as well as System III { / nt }, for which we constructed a distinguishing formula above, there is another, quite distinct, process reachable from System II by a d transition that can be distinguished by formula c( ) ( = get challenge) representing that the case when input transition labelled with d results in feeding into a new reader session, which kills the possibility of continuing an existing session with an output transition. Note this formula is also constructed algorithmically, as we are describing, but is more due to a limitation of the model of the CSF'10 unlinkability model, that we address in Sec. 4. Hence we draw no further attention to that branch at this point.
Thereby we obtain the following formula distinguishing System II from Spec II .
The rest of the construction of formula ψ follows the pattern of steps already described above, where a diamond modality is appended, when the system leads and substitutions are pushed back through the distinguishing strategy until they instantiate the relevant input, or reach the top of the formula.
We informally depict the game that ψ describes in Fig. 8 . In the figure, annotation ( †) indicates where a process takes over as the leading process in the strategy. When a process is not leading it may have the option to try more than one counter move, represented by the branches in the strategy.
A New Chapter for Unlinkability: Refining the Model of Unlinkability
While the previous sections closed a chapter in the story of unlinkability, proving that there is an attack on the model of unlinkability of the BAC protocol as formulated in the proceedings of CSF'10 [ACRR10], this section opens a new chapter by justifying a new model of unlinkability. We demonstrate here why our proposed model of unlinkability more accurately models the distinguishing power of an attacker in this setting with multiple contactless devices, and how descriptions of attacks on the BAC protocol become clearer. In the subsequent section we show how new model discovers attacks on the PACE protocol, following a similar pattern to attacks on BAC.
The model of strong unlinkability originally proposed in CSF'10 [ACRR10] has many merits. However, a limitation we would like to draw attention to is that it matters whether or not we include the get challenge message that the reader sends to initiate the protocol. That get challenge message happens to be essential for the discovering attacks on unlinkability described in the previous section since, by limiting the get challenge messages sent and received, we can count the number of sessions that are present and thereby infer when a message sent is a cipher text in an existing session of the protocol rather than a fresh nonce at the beginning of a new protocol.
The role of get challenge message is perhaps most clearly depicted in Fig. 8 of the previous section. Observe that in order to reach the bottom-most state in the figure, we ensure that no additional sessions are started beyond the two reader sessions and one ePassport session at the beginning, which were triggered by the topmost three actions in the figure. This causes problems, three of which are highlighted below, which are all due to the modelling decision where all parties use the same channel c for output and d for inputs.
• It is inconvenient and confusing for a new reader to, throughout the strategy, add branches saying "at this point we don't start a new session." • In reality, the attacker can directly observe the difference between messages originating from each distinct session and can distinguish between a reader or an ePassport. This is not only because the attacker must be aware of the physical location of each entity, but also because, for each session, the attacker must open a new channel using the underlying transport protocol, as standardised in ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO18] . • Finally, the fact that get challenge message is useful for counting the number of each type of session initiated, is rather a misuse of that message. Message get challenge contributes nothing to this authentication protocol (other than impeding the stronger authentication property synchronisation [CMdV06] , which is immediately violated in protocols with a constant message). Hence removing it from a model of BAC should not result in attacks ceasing to exist.
The above limitations of existing models of unlinkability can be addressed simply by declaring a fresh public channel for each session. Thus we extend the model with two channels passport and reader that are used to model the creation of a new channel in the respective roles of either an ePassport or a reader. We also retain a presentation without τ transitions. The above is a general scheme for RFID protocols employing a shared symmetric key, shared through another channel (in the case of ePassports, via an OCR session).
Notice we directly employ a presentation without τ transitions, as justified in Sec. 2. This simplified the problem such that strong notions of bisimilarity may be employed, assuming each instance of Prover and Verifier are sequential processes (thereby forbidding τ-transitions internal to a single reader or ePassport).
Following the above scheme for the BAC protocol, k is ke, km, and Prover(c, ke, km) and Verifier(c, ke, km) are instantiated with the processes P BAC (c, ke, km) and V BAC (c, ke, km) below. In summary, we propose that the problem of whether there is an attack on the unlinkability of BAC can be resolved by proving that the following theorem holds. Since System BAC | = ϕ, but Spec BAC | = ϕ, by Theorem 3.4, System BAC Spec BAC . Now compare the distinguishing strategy generated by ϕ, presented in Fig. 9 , to the distinguishing strategy for ψ in the previous section, presented in Fig. 8 . The attacks described start in a similar fashion. In both figures, the system starts up two readers and an ePassport with the same keys. The specification can only follow by starting two readers with different keys; hence when the ePassport is initialised is has different keys from at least one of the readers. We draw attention to two key differences between the strategies presented below. The first notable difference between the strategies is that Fig. 9 does not require the many sub-branches of the game in Fig. 8 involving get challenge messages. Those branches that appear throughout Fig. 8 are no longer required, since we can directly observe the number of sessions that are present, rather than implicitly controlling the number of sessions by preventing new sessions from initialising. This difference is beneficial for cleaning up messy strategies, making them easier to explain, and allowing more protocols to be analysed without having to insert constant messages into the model of the protocol.
The second notable difference between the strategies is that, in Fig. 9 , the system always leads, including at the point where there is are branches. By the time the system decides which branch to take, the specification has already committed to a state where the ePassport has different keys from either the reader on channel c 1 or the reader on channel c 2 . The strategy of the system is to choose to communicate with the reader that has different keys from the ePassport. Thereby the system wins the game since it can reach a state where no error is produced by the chosen ePassport -a strategy that cannot be matched by the specification. In contrast, the strategy in Fig. 8 achieved as similar effect by changing player, letting the specification chose to communicate with a reader that certainly produces an error message.
The fact that the leader of in the strategy in Fig. 9 is always the same means that we do not require the full power of bisimilarity to discover this strategy. Indeed it is sufficient to use the similarity preorder obtained from strong early bisimilarity in Def. 2.9, but dropping the requirement that the relation is symmetric. To be explicit we can employ the following.
Definition 4.2 (similarity). A relation between extended processes R is a (strong) early simulation only if, whenever A R B the following hold:
• If A π A there exists B such that B π B and A R B . Process P is simulated by processes Q, written P Q, whenever there exists an early simulation R such that P R Q.
In both the CSF'10 formulation of unlinkability and in our scheme, it is trivial that the specification process, e.g., Spec BAC , is simulated by the system process System BAC , i.e., Spec BAC System BAC trivially holds. Hence, the problem of unlinkability as a similarity problem can be formulated as the problem of checking whether System BAC Spec BAC . It is helpful to know that similarity is sufficient for this problem, since similarity preorders have clear attacker models, e.g., in terms of probabilistic testing semantics [DvGHM08] . 4.1. Without else branches there is still an attack. Some papers that analyse the BAC protocol drop the else branch [CDS20] . This is convenient since not all tools and methods handle else branches. For example, we may instead try to use the following model of an ePassport in the system and specification processes. However, even for this variant, using bisimilarity, we discover an attack on unlinkability. To see why, observe that, if authentication succeeds, instead of checking the final message sent by the ePassport is not an error it is sufficient to check that some message is sent in that final step. If no message was transmitted, then we can infer the tests on the nonce failed. A classical FM formula distinguishing a system from the specification, modified using the process above is as follows.
Notice the difference compared to ϕ is that ϕ is not required to test whether z is not an error. Indeed, when we reach the final action of the distinguishing strategy, the specification is unable to perform any action on channel c 3 , hence cannot simulate the behaviour of the system.
4.2.
A refinement of BAC satisfying unlinkability. Another alternative is to probabilistically encrypt the error message, or produce random noise when the ePassport fails to authenticate the reader. Note this is within the scope of the BAC protocol specification, since it does not fix the form of the error message, although, to our best knowledge, all real ePassports implementing BAC send errors as constant plaintext messages. Such a refinement of BAC where error messages are obscured, does in fact satisfy unlinkability, as long as nothing happens after BAC. We can model one such variant of the BAC protocol as follows. The problem with the above unlinkable refinement of BAC is that making BAC unlinkable does not guarantee that the whole ePassport protocol satisfies unlinkability. BAC is just for authentication and establishing a session key. After authenticating the ePassport proceeds with a secure messaging phase that uses the session key to transmit personal data stored in the ePassport [MRT15] . Thus it is sufficient for an attacker to look at whether the protocol proceeds with secure messaging or not to determine whether authentication was successful. That knowledge can be used to the same effect as observing whether or not an error message was sent. Thus, for the above fix to be fully effective, the secure messaging phase should proceed even if the passport does not authenticate, transmitting dummy data indistinguishable to an observer from the real data. Such a fix is outside the scope of the current ICAO 9303 specification.
Unlinkability of the PACE protocol
We address the public communication from the office of the secretary general of ICAO, discussed in the introduction, which challenges whether the unlinkability vulnerability discovered on BAC is valid for more recent versions of the ICAO 9303 ePassport standard [MRT15] . This is a reasonable question, since the 7 th edition of the ICAO 9303 standard recommends the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol (PACE), as a more secure alternative to BAC. PACE does improve on the security of BAC, making attacks giving access to private data stored on the chip more difficult. PACE also eliminates unlinkability vulnerabilities caused by using different errors when the protocol fails for different reasons, as was the case for an implementation of BAC for French ePassports. Thus we believe that some of the most serious types of attack on unlinkability have been addressed, where such attacks allow an ePassport holder with an implementation interpreting the specification in a particular way to be tracked forever after the messages from one session with a trusted reader have been intercepted.
The line of the standard that restricts the use of error messages is the following line in section 4.4.2 of part 11 of the ICAO 9303 standard.
An eMRTD chip that supports PACE SHALL respond to unauthenticated read attempts (including selection of (protected) files in the LDS) with "Security status not satisfied" (0x6982). The above explicit statement is an improvement over the specification of BAC, however there are still unlinkability vulnerabilities in PACE as specified in the standard. As for the vulnerability in BAC, studied throughout previous sections, there are vulnerabilities valid due to differences between a successful and failed authentication session observable to an attacker, such as the presence of the error message highlighted above. We formally analyse this vulnerability using bisimilarity following our revised approach to unlinkability justified in Sec. 4. 5.1. The PACE protocol. There are multiple ways to interpret the PACE protocol since it has various operational modes that permit a number of cryptographic primitives to be used at each stage for establishing shared keys. We model here the generic mapping which uses a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The message exchange, presented in Fig. 10 , follows closely related work communicated in JCS'19 [HBD19] , thereby avoiding unnecessary debate on how the protocol is interpreted.
The message flow in Fig. 10 is as follows.
(1) The ePassport shares information for generating a key k with the reader, usually via an OCR session with the biometric page of the ePassport. This is modelled by the dotted line above. PACE uses better sources of randomness than BAC, however this does not affect our unlinkability analysis. (2) The ePassport key uses the key k to transmit an encrypted nonce {s} k to the reader.
(3) The ePassport and reader employs one of several operational modes to create additional randomness. We model the "generic mapping" operational mode which employs a Diffie-Hellman handshake. This information is used to generate shared key G = gen (g nr ) nt , s , where gen(·, ·) is key generation function. Notice G =Ĝ in Fig. 10 . (4) A Diffie-Hellman handshake is performed using G as the generator, which is used to compute a MAC key km. Also an encryption key for the secure messaging phase, which we do not model, is generated at this point.
(5) The checks G nr G nt avoid reflection attacks, where an ePassport or reader is used to authenticate itself. (6) Finally the ePassport and reader exchange and verify MACs, using the km, authenticating the public keys exchanged in the previous step. If authentication fails at this point an error message is produced. Notice we include the above mentioned error message (0x6982) if authentication fails at the end of the protocol.
5.2. PACE in the applied π-calculus. For PACE we require an extended message theory. We require symmetric encryption, where decryption is not detectable (modelled by the same equations as employed for BAC). For the Diffie-Hellman exchanges we require exponentiation and also a key generating map, which acts like a two parameter hash function. As with BAC, MACs are modelled as a two parameter hash function. This message theory is presented below.
The ePassport and reader for the PACE protocol can be modelled in the applied π-calculus as follows. Notice only the ePassport features an error message if authentication fails in the final step. Also, we add a dummy event c(n) at the end of the reader session, for the sake of modelling that a reader will proceed to do something after successfully authenticating. This is to align with related work in JCS'19 [HBD19] , in order to facilitate a comparison of results obtained. Using the above processes, and our revised scheme for unlinkability in the previous section we obtain the following result confirming there are attacks on the unlinkability of PACE. The formula ξ proving that unlinkability does not hold for the PACE protocol follows a similar pattern to the formula ϕ, used in the previous section to certify that BAC fails unlinkability. In this strategy, the system starts two readers and an ePassport with the same keys. The specification can only follow using a strategy where one of the readers will fail authentication. To win this game, the system simply chooses to authenticate with the reader that is expected to fail in the specification. That reader will obviously successfully authenticate in the system, thereby concluding our distinguishing strategy. 5.3. Another attack strategy from related work. Infinitely many distinguishing strategies exist for PACE. Indeed related work [HBD19] discovered a violation of unlinkability for PACE, that can be described as a trace. An attack on unlinkability formulated using trace equivalence is always also an attack on bisimilarity. The added value that our methodology brings to that attack, is that we can certify their attack by using the following classical FM formula, describing the distinguishing trace discovered in the above mentioned related work.
In the strategy described by the formula above, the encrypted nonce sent by the ePassport at the beginning of the protocol is replayed to two different readers. The two readers are then used to authenticate each other, exploiting the fact that the protocol is symmetric in the role of the reader and ePassport. Authentication will only be successful if both readers have the same keys, otherwise either reader will fail the check on the MAC at the final step of the PACE protocol. Thus, assuming that a reader does something after authentication, we learn whether both readers talked with the same ePassport. The attack ϑ is quite different from attack ξ. Notice ϑ requires two readers to be fully active during the attack, not simply present in principal, as a choice in a game, suggesting that it may be more difficult to exploit, despite being described as a trace. Also, notice the attack can be mitigated in several ways, e.g., by initially responding to the ePassport in the same way regardless of whether it authenticates or not, hence, since an ePassport cannot also be authenticated at the same time, there is no way to continue with the secure messaging phase. An alternative fix preventing this attack is proposed in related work [HBD19] , modifying the protocol such that additional role specific information is added to the handshake. However, these fixes will not mitigate the problem described in ξ, so do not really improve unlinkability.
5.4.
Further risks to unlinkability. The fact that PACE offers several different operational modes, can be seen as a privacy risk. In order for a reader to determine the appropriate operational model, before starting the protocol, the ePassport declares the operational modes of PACE that it implements. In an environment, such as an airport, where many different ePassport, possibly implementing different operational modes coexist, a user may be tracked with a probability better than a random guess of whether two sessions are with the same ePassport.
The actual probability of guessing correctly that the same ePassport is involved in two sessions depends on the number of passport holders and their expected movements. However, the advantage gained by this strategy is non-negligible in a system with at least two participants. It is standard in security and privacy models that gaining a non-negligible advantage counts as an attack. Hence such probabilistic attacks, count as attacks and get worse as the observable diversity of implementations increase.
Related work
Both the CSF'10 specification of unlinkability [ACRR10] and our proposed specifications of unlinkability are defined in terms of a specification and a system. We support this direction rather than modelling unlinkability in terms of two systems where the identities of users differ. We draw attention to this modelling decisions since the latter approach has been used in related work communicated in S&P'18 [CKR18] to discover attacks on the BAC protocol. In such an alternative model comparing systems, in the two session case, a system with two sessions with the same ePassport is compared to a system with two sessions with different ePassports. The limitation we see is that approach discovers attack traces that cannot be used to positively confirm two session are with the same ePassport. The attack discovered using the method communicated in S&P'18 can only be used to confirm that two sessions are certainly not with the same ePassport.
Note, while an approach where we compare permutations of users in a system has been demonstrated to be preferable for voter privacy in eVoting systems [DKR09] , we argue that the system vs. specification approach is appropriate for unlinkability, since if an attack is discovered it will certainly be able to positively confirm that two session are with the same ePassport. Notice that the limitation highlighted above, where a property is violated by only discovering attacks confirming two users are different, is not an issue for voter privacy since for all voters are different already.
Conclusion
This paper confirms there are attacks on the authentication protocols proposed in the latest ICAO 9303 specification for ePassports. Both BAC and PACE feature attacks that can be described as a distinguishing strategy in game played with an idealised specification of what it means to satisfy unlinkability. Attacks on BAC, communicated in Theorem 2.3 and Theorem 4.1, are interesting since the former resolves flawed claims that no such attack exists according to a formulation of unlinkability dating back to CSF'10; while the latter irons out limitations of that original model concerning the capabilities of an attacker to distinguish messages from different readers and ePassports. The attack on PACE in Theorem 5.1 is interesting, since it is is not mitigated by defensive strategies that do mitigate attacks already communicated in JCM'19. This insight is impactful for society, since ePassports are used by the citizens of over 150 countries at the time of writing. A quick fix is to ensure that the manufactures and operators of readers are aware of mitigation strategies, discussed in the conference version of this paper. A longer term fix would be to redesign the protocols in the ICAO 9303 specification such that ePassport holders need not rely on the manufacturers and operators of readers to address such vulnerabilities.
Further to uncovering the above mentioned attacks, this paper makes multiple technical contributions. We proposed and justified a new scheme for unlinkability problems in Sec. 4. We proposed a definition of open bisimilarity for the applied π-calculus (Def. 3.2). Our formulations of weak and strong early bisimilarity and similarity (Defs. 2.2, 2.9, and 4.2) for the applied π-calculus are also new for the applied π-calculus, incorporating minor improvements facilitating verification. Although, these improvements are rather conventional from the perspective of established work on the π-calculus; thus, in that direction, we simply modernise the applied π-calculus with respect to advances in the π-calculus literature. The formulation of modal logic classical FM is also new, as is the rather short and neat proof (in the appendix) of the fact that that classical FM characterises strong early bisimilarity for the applied π-calculus (Theorem 3.4). The methodology of using a classical FM formula to certify attacks is new, as is the use of open bisimilarity to discover distinguishing strategies that are transformed into attacks whenever the distinguishing strategy is not spurious. The reformulation of unlinkability removing τ-transitions has appeared in related work [HBD19] , but the proof that the new specification preserves the original specification in terms of bisimilarity (Theorem 2.10) is new, as is the observation that this transformation reduces the unlinkability problem to a problem were image finiteness holds and strong notions of bisimilarity may be applied. In short, in order to solve this problem, we have set up a rich tool chain of methods that can be applied beyond the problem of analysing the unlinkability of the ICAO 9303 standard. then by definition of satisfaction, A | = M = N hence, by definition of R, B | = M = N, hence by definition of satisfaction, Mσ = Nσ. Therefore A and B are statically equivalent.
Case of actions. Suppose A π A . Hence A | = π tt, so by definition of R, we have B | = π tt and hence for some B we have B π B . By image-finiteness, there are finitely many B i such that B π B i . Suppose for contradiction that A R B i does not hold for all i. Then for all i, there exists φ i such that A | = φ i and B i | = φ i . Hence A | = π i φ i but B | = π i φ i , contradicting the assumption that A R B. Hence for some i, A R B i , as required.
Thus, R is a strong early bisimilarity, if, for all formula φ, we have P | = φ if and only if Q | = φ, then we have P ∼ Q.
The converse direction follows by induction on the structure of φ. Assume P ∼ Q, hence there is some strong early bisimulation R such that P R Q. In the following, assume that A R B holds. Case of action. Consider when A | = π φ. Hence A π A such that A | = φ. Since R is a strong early bisimulation, there exists B such that B π B and A R B . Hence, by the induction hypothesis, B | = φ. Hence B | = π φ.
Hence, by induction on the structure of φ, for all formulae φ, and for all A, B such that A R B, we have A | = φ iff B | = φ; and hence P | = φ iff Q | = φ, since P R Q.
